Death to Tyrants! (33 page)

Philippe Gauthier has offered an interpretation of the oligarchs' manipulation that is based, in large part, on information provided in the Ilian tyrant-killing law and Lykourgos's speech
Against Leokrates
.
¹⁹
The Ilion law explicitly encourages individuals to kill tyrants or leaders of an oligarchy (19–24); oligarchs and tyrants, that is, were conceptually equivalent. In Lykourgos's speech, the orator claims (51) that, whereas the Athenians erect statues of tyrant killers and victorious generals in the agora, the citizens of other states erect statues of athletes. Based on those two texts, Gauthier suggests that, upon taking control of the polis, the oligarchs were concerned about the fact that a statue glorifying and encouraging the assassination of nondemocratic leaders stood prominently in the agora. They would have liked to destroy the statue, but concluded that doing so would provoke a democratic uprising. Thus they formulated a subtler, long-term plan. In the dead of night, they took out the sword, thereby transforming the portrait (
εἰκών
) of Philites the tyrannicide into a generic statue (
ἀνδριάς
) of an athlete.
²⁰
Over time, the oligarchs hoped, the people of Erythrai would forget about the political significance of the statue and thereby evacuate the statue of its “power.”

Gauthier's interpretation is, in its details, not entirely convincing. Perhaps the biggest weakness is that it simply would be too difficult to “reinvent” the statue. The statue of Philites, like the statues Harmodios and Aristogeiton in Athens, was clearly very well known to all democrats. Thus they would quickly notice such a large-scale alteration and respond accordingly. Another weakness in Gauthier's interpretation is that the oligarchs were almost certainly neglecting the statue conspicuously: the oligarchs, presumably, would not let the statue of a heroic athlete gather verdigris. In short, the oligarchs were insulting the statue and, by extension, the democrats.

The details of his interpretation notwithstanding, Gauthier quite likely identified the oligarchs' actual intention behind the manipulation of the statue: to change the message that it sent to the people of Erythrai in order to prevent individual democrats from becoming tyrant killers and rising up against the regime. The following comments expand upon that important insight.

THIS CHAPTER'S INTERPRETATION

I argue below that both oligarchs and democrats manipulated the statue of Philites in order to affect the ability of the democrats to mobilize in defense of their democracy. The oligarchs did so in order to negatively affect the democrats' ability; the democrats did so in order to positively affect it. To substantiate that assertion, the following comments examine the oligarchs' actions first, the democrats' reaction second.

MANIPULATION BY THE OLIGARCHS

By removing the sword from the statue of Philites while allowing the statue itself to stand, the oligarchs widely publicized to all the inhabitants of Erythrai two complementary, negative messages about tyrannicide.
²¹
First, they advertised that tyrannicide, qua rebellion that ushers in democracy, will fail. The symbolism is clear and straightforward: without a sword, Philites (i.e., rebellion) looked impotent, unable to harm anyone, much less overthrow a nondemocratic regime. And it is quite important to note that history “backed up” the statue's new symbolic significance: the democracy ushered in by Philites did, in fact, fail.

Second, by removing the sword from the statue, the oligarchs advertised that tyrannicide, qua “going first,” is very costly. The would-be tyrannicide would die, of course: Philites did (presumably). But the oligarchs' alteration of the statue showed that the would-be tyrant killer would pay an even higher price than death. Indeed, contemplating the image of Philites with a missing sword and gathering verdigris (a sign of neglect) would force an individual to conclude that, should he “go first,” he will die
and
be remembered forever as a failure, a source of shame to both his ancestors and descendants.

The manipulation of the statue of Philites thus appears to have been the propaganda component of the oligarchs' “regime maintenance” strategy. That manipulation generated and maintained common knowledge that “democracy failed and thus resistance is futile.” If people believed that, or even if they thought that others did, they would be less likely to join a pro-democracy rebellion in its early moments: they would doubt that a sufficient number of people would follow them. And particularly bold individuals would be much less inclined to commit the initial, quite daring act of tyrannicide. Instead, a dynamic like that in Athens during the coup of the Four Hundred would take root: (1) individuals falsify their preference and raise their revolutionary thresholds; (2) an ignorance cascade sweeps through the population; (3) pro-democrats are paralyzed by pluralistic ignorance. And, as
chapter 1
's discussion about threshold sequences demonstrated, even slight increases in individuals' revolutionary thresholds can be devastating: they could transform a pro-mobilization threshold sequence into an anti-mobilization threshold.

It must be admitted that, for their propaganda campaign to be effective, the oligarchs also must have implemented some sort of intimidation campaign. There is no direct evidence for such a campaign in Erythrai. But one might reasonably infer its presence. To begin with, regimes with only minority support, generally speaking, must both misinform and intimidate the population in order to retain control of the state: (1) if they only punished individuals for publicly defying the regime, those individuals could still discover that they are part of a majority that is ready and willing to rebel; (2) if they relied solely on misinformation—i.e., publicly asserting that the regime enjoys overwhelming popular support—individuals would take the risk to dissent publicly and thus discover whether or not their fellow citizens actually support the regime. In addition, one might suspect that the democrats did not fix the statue earlier because they were afraid to do so. And finally, the oligarchs likely would not insult the democrats so directly unless they had an adequate backup force.
²²

MANIPULATION BY THE DEMOCRATS

By repairing the statue and crowning it at the beginning of every month and at all festivals, the democrats accomplished two complementary, instrumental
ends. First, they countered head-on both aspects of the oligarchs' “anti-tyrannicide” propaganda. On the one hand, by restoring the sword, they proclaimed that tyrannicide, qua rebellion that ushers in democracy, does, in fact, “work”: Philites (i.e., rebellion) is shown as powerful, determined. And, just as when the oligarchs manipulated the statue, recent history corroborated that assertion: not only did the democrats' most recent rebellion succeed, but, by glorifying Philites after retaking control of the polis, the democrats appear to suggest that the democracy now in power originated in the Philites-led revolution; oligarchy, that is, was merely an unfortunate interlude. On the other hand, by crowning the statue so frequently, the democrats ensured that everybody knew that an act of tyrannicide, qua “going first” and initiating a pro-democracy mobilization, would be greatly rewarded. There is no telling what specific rewards a tyrannicide would receive (other than, presumably, a statue), but they clearly would have been spectacular: Philites was treated as quasi-divine.

Second, Erythraian pro-democrats generated common knowledge of widespread commitment to support the democracy. The ritual conditions under which the democrats crowned Philites are not known and likely varied according to the particular occasion. However, the democrats of Erythrai almost certainly ceremoniously crowned the statue in front of a large crowd of spectators after announcing why they did so: “We crown Philites because he gave us democracy.” Applause or some sort of sign of mass approval likely followed. Thus everybody in attendance would know the political commitments of his fellow citizens and perhaps those of the larger Erythraian society.
²³
And it is important to note that such “tyrannicide ceremonies” were repeated presumably well over twelve times a year, thereby ensuring that that sentiment was preserved as common knowledge. As noted at the end of
chapter 4
, maintenance of such common knowledge would be particularly important for “new” democracies. (One wonders if the oligarchs previously sought to atomize the population by having few festivals—fewer opportunities for democrats to congregate and discover the preferences of their fellow citizens.)

It is thus reasonably clear that pro-democrats manipulated the statue of Philites in order to increase the likelihood that they would be able to mobilize en masse in response to a coup d'état. The repeated commitment rituals would convince individuals to lower their revolutionary thresholds and participate in a pro-democracy rebellion earlier than they otherwise would have (because they believe that others will follow). And the glorification of Philites would convince particularly brave individuals that it would be worth the risk to strike the first blow and “kill a tyrant.” In short, Erythraian pro-democrats
sought to induce a “pro-mobilization” threshold sequence. Challenging their regime would thus be a very risky proposition.

The previous discussion demonstrated that both the oligarchs and the democrats manipulated the statue of Philites in order to affect the democrats' ability to mobilize in defense of their democracy. The statue was not simply a static, bronze object. It was a tool—a medium—for generating and maintaining common knowledge about Erythraian (revolutionary) politics.
²⁴
The oligarchs used it to send the message that “resistance is futile.” If that were widely believed, resistance would be unlikely. The democrats used it to send the message “resistance will succeed.” If that were believed, large-scale resistance would be more likely. Indeed, to the extent that the ability of the majority to mobilize determined whether or not a polis would be governed democratically, one might make the following conclusion: both oligarchs and democrats considered the manipulation of the statue of Philites—that is, control of its message—to play an important role in determining whether or not there would be democracy in Erythrai.

Creation and Subsequent Manipulation of the Statue: When?

Scholars generally agree that the events referred to in the Philites stele occurred in the aftermath of important moments in the early Hellenistic period.
²⁵
But they do not agree on which moments. Dittenberger concluded (
Syll
.
³
284) that the events followed Alexander's conquest of western Asia Minor (i.e., circa 334–332): they would thus follow the implementation of Alexander's democratization policy discussed in
chapter 4
.
²⁶
Heisserer disagreed with Dittenberger primarily on the grounds that the Philites stele does not mention the name Alexander (as is the case, for example, in Alexander's “letter to the Chians” [
RO
84] and the “anti-tyranny dossier” from Eresos [
RO
83]). Heisserer (1979: 291–93), instead, dates the events referred to in the stele to the confusing aftermath of the battle of Ipsos (i.e., post-301), when, as happened in Priene, a tyrant might very well have capitalized on the disorder before Lysimachos solidified his control of the region.
²⁷
Engelmann
and Merkelbach (
I. Erythrai
503), however, suggest—based on the Philites stele's letterforms—that the relevant events occurred circa 280, just after the battle of Kouroupedion, when Erythrai became part of the Seleukid empire.
²⁸

Dating the relevant events is potentially complicated by Heisserer's conclusion that the Philites stele is a commemorative text. It might not have been inscribed, that is, immediately following the
dēmos
's initial order to repair and clean the statue. Heisserer bases his conclusion on two points. First, the stele's two decrees have an abbreviated enactment formula. The full formula for Erythrai's democratically promulgated decrees is “resolved by the council and the
dēmos
, a motion of the generals, prytanies, and exetastai” (
ἔδοξεν τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι· στρατηγῶν
,
πρυτάνεων
,
ἐξεταστῶν γνώμη
). The enactment formula for both decrees in the Philites stele, however, is “resolved by the council and the
dēmos
” (
ἔδοξεν τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι
). Second, the Philites stele does not record historical information: one might expect that the decree would make some mention of important historical circumstances such as the fall of the tyrant or the fall of the oligarchy, for example. Heisserer's conclusion will be disputed below. But it does open up the (small) possibility that the events referred to in the Philites stele occurred well before the stele itself was inscribed, for which the latest plausible date is the third quarter of the third century.

The following comments argue for the following, lengthy historical sequence. First, the Erythraian democrats erected the statue of Philites following Alexander's conquest of western Asia Minor (i.e., circa 332). Second, the oligarchs removed the sword from the statue in the aftermath of the battle of Ipsos (i.e., post-301). Third, the democrats repaired the statue after the battle of Kouroupedion (i.e., post-281). That is Dittenberger, Engelmann and Merkelbach, and Heisserer were all partially correct—but incorrect in placing all of the events into a short period of time. However, on the (quite slim) chance that Heisserer's commemorative text theory is correct, I assess briefly two possible pre-Alexander dates for the events referred to in the Philites stele. If nothing else, the discussion will provide an opportunity to explore additional periods of stasis in Erythrai's history.