Death to Tyrants! (2 page)

Death to Tyrants!

Introduction

A deciding factor for the survival of a democratic regime in an ancient Greek polis was the capability of its supporters to defeat their domestic opponents in an armed confrontation. If they had that capability, pro-democrats (the
dēmos
) would have the power (
kratos
) to impose their will. The polis would thus be governed by a
dēmokratia
. If pro-democrats did not have such capability, however, anti-democrats would take control of the polis and impose their will. The polis then would be governed by either an oligarchy or a tyranny.
¹

Whether or not the pro-democrats of a given polis could defeat their domestic opponents depended largely on the number of men who would mobilize on the pro-democrats' behalf. It is true that, on average, anti-democrats likely had important advantages, such as greater financial resources, superior weaponry and training, important interpersonal connections, and more free time to plot and to plan. Thus one pro-democrat did not necessarily “pack the same punch” as one anti-democrat. Nevertheless, the deciding factor in an armed confrontation almost certainly would come down to numbers: the pro-democrats' chances for victory increasing in more or less direct proportion to the extent of their numerical superiority over their anti-democrat opponents.

This logic is simple, but it could be quite challenging for pro-democrats to mobilize in response to a well-organized coup. The most crucial explanatory dynamic is straightforward: an individual pro-democrat who publicly defended his regime with insufficient support from his fellow pro-democrats would almost certainly be killed. In the event of a coup, therefore, individual pro-democrats likely would give no clear public indication of their actual political preference and would wait for a large number of people to join the fight
before
they thought it safe enough to join. As a result, an insufficient number of pro-democrats would fight in defense of their democracy and the anti-democratic regime would retain power. The pro-democrats would thus have had what I call a “revolutionary coordination problem.”

Despite the apparent difficulty involved in mobilizing in defense of a given democracy, democratic regimes flourished in the ancient Greek world during the Classical and early Hellenistic periods. Data culled from Hansen and Nielsen's
Inventory
of Archaic and Classical Poleis
supports two crucial points. First, with respect to those cites for which the
Inventory
provides information on regime type, the percentage of cities that experienced a democracy, however briefly, increased over time: 8 percent (6 out of 76 cities) experienced democracy at some point during the second half of the sixth century;
²
18 percent (16 out of 89) did so in the first half of the fifth century; 40 percent (51 out of 126) did in the second half of the fifth century; 46 percent (54 out of 117) did in the first half of the fourth century; and 46 percent (52 out of 112 cities) did at some point in the second half of the fourth century. Second, the number of geographic regions that contained at least one polis that experienced democracy increased over time: during the second half of the sixth century, there is evidence for democratically governed poleis in five (out of thirty-nine) regions; during the first half of the fifth century the number rises to twelve; in the second half of the fifth century it is twenty-one regions; for the first half of the fourth century it is also twenty-one; and the number of regions rises to twenty-four in the second half of the fourth century. The data, admittedly, are noisy and often problematic. But the trend is clear: the ancient Greek world became increasingly more densely democratic during the Classical and early Hellenistic periods.
³

In light of the preceding comments, it appears reasonable to suspect that democratic regimes flourished in the ancient Greek world in large part because their supporters developed methods or mechanisms to mobilize en masse in response to coup d'états—to solve the revolutionary coordination problem. That is, admittedly, a simple conclusion. But there would seem to be only three principal objections. And each may be countered.

The first objection is that most democratic regimes survived, in large part, because they did not have motivated domestic opposition. That there were anti-democrats in most cities is obvious—there can be very little doubt about it.
⁴
But it does not necessarily follow that the anti-democrats in the various cities were sufficiently motivated to overthrow democracies. They might have concluded, for example, that the democratic status quo—despite its injustice (in their minds)—was tolerable. Or perhaps they had been effectively socialized by pro-democracy ideology. They might actually think that democratic governance advances their interests.
⁵

This “lack of credible domestic opposition” theory is not particularly persuasive. First, stasis was a common problem for most poleis from the Archaic through the early Hellenistic periods. Hansen and Nielsen's
Inventory
(index 19), for example, records 279 instances of stasis in 122 different poleis. And, as Hansen and Nielsen note (p. 125), those numbers—impressive as they are—do not capture the full extent of the phenomenon. It is thus reasonable to conclude that most regimes, be they democratic, oligarchic, or tyrannical, had motivated domestic opposition.
⁶
Second, literary passages clearly suggest that, generally speaking, oligarchs in most cities were eager to overthrow the governing democracy. The fifth-century author known as the Old Oligarch, for example, wrote (1.5) that “everywhere on earth the best element (
to beltiston
) is opposed to democracy.” And according to Aristotle (
Pol
. 1310a8–12) the oligarchs in some poleis swore, “I will be hostile to the
dēmos
and will plan whatever evil I can against them.”
⁷

The second objection is that most democratic regimes survived, in large part, because they were propped up by an external power or powers. The logic of this objection is quite simple: (1) if anti-democrats staged a coup, they would be challenged militarily by the outside power that supported the
dēmos
; (2) the combined forces from the outside power and the
dēmos
would likely defeat the anti-democrats in an armed confrontation; (3) the anti-democrats would thus choose not to stage a coup in the first place.

This “external power theory” is intelligible, but its significance should not be overstated. Even the Athenians, a people most willing and able to prop up
democracies, were by no means consistent in their interventions: the aforementioned Old Oligarch, for example, wrote (3.11) that, in the fifth century, they supported the upper classes in many cities; and we know that they even supported “tyrants” in the fourth century.
⁸
It would, in fact, stand to reason that, in general, an external power would prop up a given democracy only if it concluded that that democracy's domestic supporters would soon be able to maintain control of the polis by themselves. One might appeal here to the difficulties recently encountered by the United States in its attempt to prop up democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the survival of a given democracy, internal factors are primary and external factors, although important, are generally secondary.

The third objection is that pro-democrats would have “naturally” overcome difficulties of mobilization in defense of their democracy. The best basis for that objection is that most Greek poleis were rather small. And if the citizen population of a given polis was small enough, each citizen might gain knowledge of both the nature and intensity of each of his fellow citizens' political preferences simply from everyday interpersonal interactions. If he knew from such interactions that a majority of them are willing to fight to defend the democracy and that everybody knows that, he likely would assume greater risk in defending the democracy too: he would not wait for a large number of other individuals to act before he does because he would trust that a sufficient number of individuals would follow him.

This “natural solution” theory is reasonable, but its applicability should not be overstated. Malcolm Gladwell has suggested that members of a community larger than about 150 active members cannot rely on interpersonal relationships to solve problems that affect the community as a whole.
⁹
Most poleis (even small ones), however, had several times that number of citizens.
¹⁰
And mobilizing in response to a coup attempt is particularly dangerous: a person would not act unless he was fully confident that his fellow citizens would risk their lives in defense of the democracy too. One might thus conclude that something “artificial” (i.e., the use of some technology) would have to be created to instill and maintain that trust.

Since the preceding three objections do not fully persuade, it remains reasonable to suspect that democratic regimes persisted in the ancient Greek world in large part because their supporters devised means to mobilize en
masse in response to a coup attempt. Some democratic regimes, it is true, might not have had motivated domestic opponents. Some might have been completely propped up by external powers. And the supporters of some democratic regimes might have been able to solve their coordination problems naturally. But, in general, the survival of a given democracy ultimately came down to the capability of domestic supporters to act in its defense. A fundamental question for historians of ancient Greek democracy thus should be, how did pro-democrats in the various democratically governed poleis ensure that they could mobilize in the event of a coup?

This book examines one peculiar, but apparently quite popular, means by which pro-democrats in ancient Greece facilitated large-scale mobilization in defense of their democracy: the promulgation of tyrant-killing legislation—the promulgation, that is, of laws and decrees that explicitly encouraged individuals to “kill a tyrant.”

The Athenians promulgated the earliest known tyrant-killing law—called the decree of Demophantos—in June 410, immediately after the democracy, which had been overthrown in the coup of the Four Hundred, had been reestablished.
¹¹
That decree required all Athenians to swear an oath both to kill “whoever overthrows the democracy at Athens (
ὃς ἂν καταλύσῃ τὴν δημοκρατίαν τὴν Ἀθήνησι
) or holds any office while the democracy is overthrown” and to reward anybody who kills such a man. In crafting the language of that oath, however, Demophantos included language found in an old Athenian anti-tyranny law (
Ath
.
Pol
. 16.10)
¹²
and made specific reference to Harmodios and Aristogeiton, Athens's two famous tyrannicides. Thus, in addition to a general pledge to kill participants of an anti-democratic coup and to reward anyone who kills such a man, all Athenians pledged both to kill “anyone who aims to rule tyrannically or helps to set up the tyrant” (
ἐάν τις τυραννεῖν ἐπαναστῇ ἢ τὸν τύραννον συγκαταστήσῃ
) and to treat “just like Harmodios and Aristogeiton” (
καθάπερ Ἁρμόδιόν τε καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα
) anyone who might die attempting to kill a tyrant.
¹³

Three tyrant-killing laws, promulgated in three different cities, were almost certainly modeled off of the decree of Demophantos. The Eretrians ratified the earliest such law in 341, immediately after the Athenians overthrew a pro-Macedonian “tyranny” in that city and reestablished a democratic regime. The Athenians themselves passed another tyrant-killing law, called the law of Eukrates, in the spring of 336, nearly two years after Philip II defeated the Athenian-led coalition at the epoch-making battle of Chaironeia. And the third law comes from Ilion and dates to circa 280. It was likely promulgated shortly after Seleukos I defeated Lysimachos at the Battle of Kouroupedion and consequently assumed control of much of Asia Minor. Each of these laws contains the generic language similar to that found in the decree of Demophantos: a reward is publicly offered to “whoever kills a tyrant” (
ὃς δ᾿ ἂν ἀποκτείνηι τὸν τύραννον
) and the primary concern articulated is the “overthrow of the democracy” (
καταλύειν τὴν δημοκρατίαν
).
¹⁴

Inscribed tyrant-killing documents from two additional cities must be considered together with the aforementioned laws. From Eresos we have a dossier of inscribed texts concerning a trial, ordered by Alexander the Great, of two men who ruled Eresos as “tyrants” in 333. Significantly, the Eresians executed those tyrants and did so in accordance to their “law against tyrants” (
ὁ νόμος ὁ κατὰ τῶν τυράννων
). We do not have that law. But we know that they had one. And the dossier allows us to assess the significance of its application for the survival of the Eresian democracy. The second city is Erythrai, from which we have an inscribed decree of the
dēmos
, dating to the early Hellenistic period, that ordered the repairing and frequent crowning of their statue “of Philites the tyrant killer” (
Φιλίτου τοῦ ἀποκτείναντος τὸν τύραννον
); during an earlier oligarchy, the oligarchs had desecrated it. The document from Erythrai is not a law, but it publicly encourages tyrannicide and thus contains the defining element of an inscribed tyrant-killing law.
¹⁵

The aforementioned tyrant-killing laws and decrees were thus promulgated in three distinct periods, each of which was important in the history of ancient Greek democracy. The first period, to which belongs the decree of Demophantos, is late-fifth-century Athens, when the viability of the democratic regime that governed that most important polis was severely threatened. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the viability of Greek democracy in the post–Peloponnesian War period was largely dependent on the viability of Athens' democracy.
¹⁶
The law from Eretria and Athens' law of
Eukrates, on the other hand, date to the end of the so-called Classical period, when the Athenians and their allies combated the attempts by Philip of Macedon and his supporters to subvert democratic regimes on the Greek mainland. And the final three texts—the dossier from Eresos, the “Philites stele” from Erythrai, and the Ilian tyrant-killing law—date to the early Hellenistic period, when, quite remarkably, Alexander and several of his successors encouraged the democratization of the Greek poleis in the eastern Aegean and western Asia Minor. There is reason to conclude that tyrant-killing legislation was much more popular than the six aforementioned texts might suggest. As we will see in
chapter 4
, Alexander the Great heavily promoted anti-tyranny and tyrannicide ideology during his conquest of western Asia Minor: he ordered the citizens of various cities to punish the leaders of their pro-Persian faction, whom he specifically referred to as “tyrants”; he issued an anti-tyranny proclamation to the Greek cities in 331, after the battle of Gaugamela; he publicly announced his intention to return to Athens the original statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton that had been stolen by Xerxes's forces in 479.
¹⁷
And, as we will see in the conclusion to
chapter 6
, there is (often very fragmentary, to be sure) epigraphic evidence from several Asia Minor cities for anti-tyranny or tyrant-killing promulgations that date to the first several decades after Alexander's conquest. Important examples come from Kalymna, Ephesos, Mylasa, Priene, Olbia, and (perhaps) Nisyros. Thus, when one also takes into consideration the inscriptions from Eresos, Erythrai, and Ilion, there is reason to suspect that the use of tyrant-killing legislation was particularly widespread in western Asia Minor during the earlier years of the Hellenistic period.