Death to Tyrants! (16 page)

The first point is that the priests and priestesses pronounced the curse at both the Dionysia and the Artimisia. The Dionysia was held in the city of Eretria on 12 Lenaion; the Artimisia was held in Eretria's countryside about two months later (end of Anthesterion).
⁴⁵
It is quite reasonable to suppose, therefore, that virtually every citizen, whether he lived in the
asty
or the
chora
, heard the curse. The performance context for the oath's pronouncement is unknown. But it is quite likely that the law was displayed, read, or—at the very least—repeatedly referred to.
⁴⁶
And the “audience” likely made signs of commitment to enforce the law or to show their support of the curse's sentiment.

The second point is that the priests and priestess pronounced the curses annually. This is not stated explicitly, but it is certainly implied. Doing so provided an opportunity for each Eretrian both to reaffirm publically his commitment to uphold the tyrant-killing law and to observe his fellow citizens reaffirm publically their own commitment. Widespread support for the tyrant-killing law—that is, to defend the democracy—would thus be maintained
as common knowledge. And that would be very important in a “young” democracy where credibility of commitment could be doubted.

It thus appears that the Eretrian democrats established a solid general layer of defense for their new democracy. On the one hand, they directly incentivized all male members of their larger society to kill any (prominent) member of a nondemocratic regime or participant in an anti-democracy coup. On the other hand, they ensured that widespread credible commitment to uphold the tyrant-killing law (i.e., to defend the democracy) remained common knowledge. Success could not be guaranteed, of course. But they did greatly increase the likelihood that, at anytime while the democracy is threatened or overthrown, someone would “kill a tyrant” and thus spark a revolutionary bandwagon that would overwhelm the anti-democrats.

FIRST PARTICULAR LAYER OF DEFENSE

Lines 3–13 in New Fragment

The promulgation of the Eretrian tyrant-killing law provided the first particular layer of defense by increasing the likelihood that a sufficient number of democrats would successfully respond to subversive activity
before
anti-democrats actually overthrew the democracy. It did so by explicitly criminalizing two subversive acts.

The first subversive action criminalized (lines 3–6) is unauthorized traveling abroad by a member of the council or (likely) a magistrate (
archōn
). There could be any number of reasons why the Eretrians criminalized such behavior. But perhaps the single most important objective was to prevent individuals with institutional authority from communicating with foreign agents or Eretrian exiles. A councilman or magistrate, for example, might formulate a plan with such individuals to overthrow the Eretrian democracy. And, upon returning to Eretria, he could use the power of his office to implement it. Thus the law equates such unauthorized travel with “dissolving the
dēmos
.”
⁴⁷

The second subversive action criminalized in this section of the law (lines 6–13) is proposing (
λέγων
) or putting to vote (
ἐπιψηφίζων
) a bill that would dissolve the regime in control of Eretria. The objective here is to prevent a “legal” coup where—like what happened in Athens in 411—the assembly simply votes to change the regime. It thus should be noted that the law does not call Eretria's legitimate regime a democracy. Instead, it refers (lines 6–7) to “this regime—the one now in existence.” And later in the law (lines 19–20), the legitimate regime is described as one with a “council and
prytaneia
appointed
by lot from all Eretrians.”
⁴⁸
The Eretrians did so in order to prevent anti-democrats from using the word “democracy” in order to mask a proposal that really established some sort of oligarchy. A great example of such a trick occurred, again, in Athens during the coup of the Four Hundred when Peisandros cynically suggested in the assembly that the Athenians adopt “another type of democracy” (Thuc. 8.53.1).
⁴⁹

The punishments for committing either subversive act correspond to how immediately the act threatened the Eretrian democracy. The first act—unauthorized travel abroad—did not constitute an immediate threat. Thus the punishment was comparably mild: a guilty man would be stripped of his office immediately, and both he and his family would be deprived of their political rights (i.e., be declared
atimoi
). The second act (active involvement in a proposal to dissolve the regime in control of Eretria), on the other hand, represented an immediate threat. Thus an individual guilty of that crime would be punished severely: he would lose his political rights, his property would be confiscated, he could not be buried in Eretrian soil, and—quite remarkably—he
and his family
may be killed, the killer being rewarded just like a tyrannicide.

As noted above, the criminalization of the two subversive acts increased the likelihood that a sufficient number of democrats would successfully respond to subversive activity
before
anti-democrats actually overthrew the democracy. It is reasonable to suppose that neither of the two aforementioned subversive acts was illegal before the law's promulgation: individuals had the freedom to propose (and the
dēmos
the freedom to ratify) any motion; magistrates had complete freedom of movement. If that were the case, it would have been very difficult for democrats to coordinate in response to such acts even if many suspected that the actors were working to subvert the democracy: there would be confusion about what others think is acceptable behavior. By criminalizing those two acts, however, the Eretrians knew that such behavior was, in fact, widely viewed as unacceptable. And they also knew what to do in response (and that that response enjoyed widespread support). Thus, if a councilman traveled abroad without permission, the assembly
would be much more likely to remove him from office and deprive him of his political rights. And if someone participated in a resolution to change the regime, a supporter of the democracy would be much more likely to assassinate him. In both scenarios, the conspirators would fail.

SECOND PARTICULAR LAYER OF DEFENSE

Lines 17–24 in New Fragment

The promulgation of the tyrant-killing law provided the second particular layer of defense by increasing the likelihood that supporters of the Eretrian democracy would respond
immediately
and in sufficient numbers to a successful coup and thereby prevent the coup members from consolidating their control of the city.
⁵⁰

The Eretrian lawmakers envisioned two scenarios in which anti-democrats might succeed in overthrowing the Eretrian democracy. First, the assembly might actually vote to dissolve the democracy. Specifically, the law envisions (lines 17–20) a scenario wherein someone puts to a vote (
ἐπιψηφίζει
), drafts (
γράφει
), or votes for (
φέρει
) a bill that would change the regime.
⁵¹
It might appear as though there is a redundancy here since, just a few lines earlier (in the provisions concerning the first particular layer of defense), the law addressed a scenario wherein someone makes a proposal or puts to the vote a bill that would dissolve the current regime. The difference is that the earlier provision focuses on attempts to stage a legal coup, while the later provision focuses on a successful attempt to stage a legal coup.

The second scenario envisioned by the democrats (lines 20–21) is the use of brute force. Specifically, the law addresses someone establishing either a tyranny or oligarchy and using force (
ἐγβιάρηται
: literally “to force out”). It is quite possible, of course, that, in drawing up this provision, the Eretrians imagined any scenario wherein anti-democrats used force in order to overthrow the democracy. Two points, however, might suggest that the Eretrians had something more specific in mind. First, the immediately preceding provision considered the possibility that anti-democrats might establish a nondemocratic regime by a vote in the assembly. Second, the provision that immediately follows refers to participants in either of the two scenarios covered in the “second layer of defense”—that is, the use of assembly procedure and the use of force—as those “who will prevent [a meeting of] the assembly and
prytaneia
.” It is quite possible, then, that the Eretrians envisioned a scenario
wherein anti-democrats used force in order to expel their opponents from the assembly before a vote on regime change.

The promulgation of the Eretrian tyrant-killing law increased the likelihood that Eretrians would respond adequately to a successful coup by explicitly ordering all citizens to mobilize quickly in defense of their democracy. The moments immediately following a coup are crucial in determining who will control the state. If democrats respond slowly—if they wait, looking around for others to act—the coup members will have time to intimidate, misinform, and ultimately atomize the population. They will have time, that is, to consolidate their control of the city. If the pro-democrats are able to mobilize quickly, however, they could overwhelm their (likely numerically inferior) opponents. But that is easier said than done: the mobilization must be large-scale; military leaders might be dead or unable to issue orders. The Eretrian democrats thus issued—in the law—the mobilization order in advance. Quite revealingly the law reads, “all citizens must assist the
dēmos
immediately and join in battle against those who will prevent [a meeting of] the assembly and
prytaneia
, each considering himself competent to fight without an order.” The hope is that there would be a leaderless uprising, a riot, throughout Eretria.
⁵²
And the coup members would be defeated before they were able to solidify their control of the city.

THIRD PARTICULAR LAYER OF DEFENSE

Line 24 to End of New Fragment

Promulgation of the tyrant-killing law provided the third particular layer of defense by increasing the likelihood that the pro-democrats would eventually be able to regain control of the polis in the event that anti-democrats successfully solidified their control of the polis.

The law articulates two scenarios—both of which indicate that the anti-democrats have consolidated their control of the city—wherein the third layer of defense would become operational. In the first scenario (lines 24–26), the anti-democrats prevent the members of the council from convening in the Agoraion. It is not entirely clear why the law focused on such a scenario. Perhaps the citizens normally looked to the council for guidance and
instructions. Thus, should the council be unable to perform that function, the democrats would be powerless. In the second scenario (line 26), the anti-democrats actually shut the
dēmos
out of the city walls. Knoepfler suggests that such a drastic development might take place during a large-scale civic festival.
⁵³

Promulgation of the tyrant-killing law increased the likelihood that the democrats would overthrow a consolidated nondemocratic regime by explicitly ordering all Eretrians to form a pro-democracy resistance movement. Specifically, the law requires (lines 26–30) every Eretrian to “secure some Eretrian stronghold, whatever seems advantageous for all helpers to arrive at; after securing [the stronghold], receive any Greek who arrives and wishes to help the
dēmos
of Eretria.” The law does not state where the democrats should convene. But that is quite reasonable: if the law publicized the location beforehand, the anti-democrats almost certainly would secure it in the early moments of the coup. Operational flexibility was essential. (The location would spread by word of mouth in the event of a coup.)

It perhaps goes without saying that an individual Eretrian would have required a good reason to join a resistance movement. Participation would be dangerous, disruptive, and time-consuming. Thus one might be tempted to “free ride,” that is, to not participate in the struggle but to benefit should it succeed. Why would an individual choose to participate? There are three complementary reasons.

The first and most fundamental reason that an individual would choose to participate is that the resistance movement would have a reasonably decent chance of success, should an adequate number of individuals join. To begin with, many—most likely most—Eretrians had already participated in resistance movements: such movements are known to have been conducted against Ploutarchos (348) and Kleitarchos (342–341).
⁵⁴
Thus people knew the drill, as it were. In addition, the Eretrians had reason to expect support from the citizens of other poleis. The Athenians, it will be recalled, were treaty bound (
IG
II
²
230) to assist the Eretrian
dēmos
in the event of a coup. And Chalkis (led by Kallias) almost certainly would provide assistance too. (Eretria was part of the Euboian League led by Chalkis [Aischin. 3.85–105]; see above in the introduction to this chapter.)

Financial considerations also would have motivated an individual to participate in the resistance movement. The law is very clear on this point (lines 32–36). If an individual joined the movement and the movement succeeded,
he would receive a portion of the property and movable goods that belonged to those individuals who did not join. The flip side of that provision, of course, is that anybody who did not join in the movement would lose his property. Thus poor individuals had the opportunity for financial gain. Rich Eretrians would be motivated to keep what they had.

The final complementary reason why an individual would choose to join the movement is that all participants were legally obliged to attack anyone who did not participate. The law does not order participants to attack anyone actively defending a nondemocratic regime. Instead, it orders (lines 30–32) the participants to attack anybody who “does not help the
dēmos
.” Thus an individual could not hope to play it safe by neither joining the resistance movement nor defending the nondemocratic regime. Each individual would have to choose which side he would actively fight for.